Over the summer, right after the EU Parliament elections, one of the emergent narratives was that the center had held, despite the success of authoritarian populists in the election, and that the joining of forces in France could provide an alternative to Marine LePen’s party. A few months later, what we see is that in the EU institutions, rather than mainstream partners voting in block to act as a counterbalance to extremist forces, they have now become comrade in arms. After dubious political maneuvering by French president Emmanuel Macron, just this December the French government collapsed, making a new far-right government in the next election even more likely (Macron has just appointed a new prime minister, the fourth PM this year). Similarly, there was momentarily a barrage of commentary about Trump winning by a landslide in the US. Looking at the data once the full results were publicly revealed, it is clear that his victory was in fact not a landslide, especially when viewed from a historical perspective.

Which stories make sense, which need to be more closely examined, or complexified, and which ones we tell ourselves because they make us feel better thus need to be interrogated.

Through the lens of the framework of authoritarian populism, the framing of left vs right is deemphasized, focusing instead on the interplay of the populist and authoritarian playbooks—a dance between rhetorical claims to speak in the name of the people against the elites with anti-democratic practices—deployed in pursuit of nativist and exclusionary goals (economics, foreign policy, and other policy-areas become subordinate to these two orienting objectives). This shift in focus can also help us make sense of the global structures of cooperation or imitation of authoritarian populists, which deploy similar narratives and policies across countries and share financial and other resources despite historical, socioeconomic, and even ideological differences. 

Recent elections and political shifts indicate that far-right movements are evolving rather than fading, with a lot of possibilities for a multipronged strategy that can help far-right actors exert complementary roles and align with different audiences. Figures like Trump and JD Vance are strategically aligning with diverse constituencies, reflecting a significant shift in GOP dynamics and broader global realignments. In Europe, the reorganization of far-right parties into three distinct groups—Meloni’s, Orbán’s, and Alternative für Deutschland—demonstrates a strategic division of roles. But we have to remember, that while elections are crucial for accessing power, they are just one of many tools for driving social change.

The far right is nothing if not strategically intersectional. In articulating the ideas that fuel their rhetoric and politics, authoritarian populists never shy away from connecting issues. Authoritarian populists have realized that instead of treating topics as siloed issue-areas that compete with each other for attention, they can all become part of a composite worldview that makes sense of an uncertain world and proactively pushes forward their vision of what the world ought to be.

As the climate crisis becomes more and more dire, the far right has tried–with varying degrees of success—to foster and capitalize on climate change-related frictions (when it hasn’t fabricated those tensions). Their climate narratives and policy proposals, as trivotal to their core ideology, are fluid and often inconsistent, and this flexibility affords them the possibility of deepening divides that can be utilized to the far right’s advantage.

Increasingly inhumane migration policy — and the accompanying narratives that justify those policies — can open the door to policies in other arenas that would have previously been decried as illiberal and anti-democratic. They normalize practices such as administrative detention and desensitize us to dehumanization. Once the far right comes to power, others have prepared the public and built the necessary legal or technological infrastructure. These migration policies can become the precursor of what’s to come for all, a harbinger of what can befall anyone deemed inconvenient, whether a citizen or not.

And as the year comes to an end and I try to reflect on the months passed, I sometimes wonder if, as I am constantly steeped in research on authoritarian populism, my perspective is too clouded by the negatives. Yet no matter where I look, whether it’s in international news, progressive spaces, or far-right forums, the pervasive sensation I observe is usually a combination of anxiety, fear, and anger. But again, is this new or worse? When has the world been fair? When have we inhabited a planet where all belong?

Authoritarian populists, on the contrary, appropriate the language of democracy activists and legal scholars, particularly arguments that relate to democracy and the rule of law, to delegitimize others who oppose them and prop themselves as the defenders of democracy, playing the game of courting large swathes of the public who would never have contemplated voting for extremists and are largely pro-democracy. They need to do so because authoritarian populists hold elections, and so, they are more dependent on the manipulation of information and the need to brand themselves as democrats.

If migration is the key topic of modern authoritarian populists, the Spanish far right party has not been an exception in promoting anti-immigrant sentiment. Rhetorically, they have unrelentingly framed unaccompanied minor migrants as criminals in insistent and odious campaigns. Now, for many not on the far right, including some young progressives, this acronym immediately brings up fears rather than compassion or solidarity. This is the frame that dominates, whether the far right is in the room or not. Far-right ideas have become detached from far-right actors.”

“Europe doesn’t talk much about race. Although some have a lot to say about racism in Europe and there are well-established anti-racist organizations across the continent, others easily conclude the conversation with something along the lines of “this is not an issue in this continent,” “it’s not about race, it’s about modern migration,” or, often, “but we are not the US.”

“… in matters of gender there are actually many differences within and between far right parties and movements in different parts of the world. The far right often adopts liberal frames when convenient, but across the board we observe a more mixed bag of narratives and policy proposals. “

In recent years, political scientists, psychologists, and commentators have grown increasingly interested in the psychological theories that explain political and social attitudes. Threat perception, the Authoritarian Dynamic, Moral Foundations Theory, and Social Dominance Theory are models that are likely to evolve and improve, but they serve as useful frameworks to understand the current moment and build empathy for those who have a different worldview - wherever you stand.

It is my belief that in no other domain – and I will admit that having worked in this space I may be slightly biased – do we see the power of narrative oceans more strongly than in migration. Unfortunately, the loudest stories that dominate the migration narrative ocean share a thread of othering and dehumanization.

“When it comes to far right authoritarian populists, who are the focus of my own research, I would argue there are at least three things (although not the only ones) that the last few years have taught us about their workings: […]”

2022 is drawing to a close. It has been – suffice it to say – an eventful year. And one would be remiss to make any predictions as to what 2023 will bring about. ‘Rising prices,’ ‘inflation,’ and ‘the cost of living’ are at the top of Europeans’ concerns. ‘Immigration’ and ‘the environment and climate change’ follow suit as top issues. Climate has been escalating the ladder of concerns, while immigration is no longer as prominent as it used to be yet remains relatively high (albeit never the highest concern).

The current situation of polycrisis, compounded by the consequences of a lingering pandemic, leave us with a social and political landscape that is volatile and exploitable. But while the far-right’s playbook is clear when it comes to migration, it is far less so when it comes to climate

This year, in the span of just a few months, two major international events are taking place that seem to hold little in common: The UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP) and the FIFA World Cup. Indeed, while most of the public does not follow climate politics and has little knowledge of COPs, the World Cup gathers the attention of millions. COPs involve political leaders, lobbyists, and activists, while the World Cup involves footballers and fans.

And yet, there is at least one clear similarity between them: they both illustrate how powerful institutions, including governments and private organizations, deem some groups worthy of protection, and others, sacrifice.

[…] Far-right leader of Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), Giorgia Meloni, has now become the first female Prime Minister of Italy.

There is absolutely nothing surprising about Viktor Orbán, of Hungary (officially considered an electoral autocracy now), congratulating Giorgia Meloni’s access to power. Or in the far-right Vox of Spain joining in the celebrations.

But it was Ursula Von Der Leyen’s tweets that reminded me of Hannah Arendt’s book and her writing on totalitarianism. To be clear: I am not saying that we can equate today’s rise of the far-right with the history of Nazism, but have we turned a corner in the whitewashing and mainstreaming of authoritarian populists in Europe?

Yet in most of the coverage pre- and post- election, the focus has not been on what the impacts of a Meloni-led government in Italy (Europe’s third largest economy) would be on these communities she rages against (migrants, LGBTQ+ people, foreigners, etc), but rather on the economic and foreign policy implications of her leadership. It seems that once more, attention is not on those who are most othered but on those who hold power. Some have even gone as far as to say that a strong Meloni would be preferable for the stability of the eurozone than her party having to rely on volatile allies like Salvini and Berlusconi  This piece in Foreign Affairs goes so far as to argue that “America and the EU Should Root for a Far-Right Populist. Who cares about human rights for those within the country?

At record high levels of inflation and with a persistent cost of living crisis, European leaders are making decisions that will shape the future of the union while also — perhaps unknowingly — setting the tone of how negotiations and life is conducted in the continent. Is it going to be a Europe of cooperation or of competition? Is it going to be an inclusive or exclusionary union? Is it going to be a Europe responding reactively to a security, economic, and social crisis, or one that is proactively shaping a climate-conscious future?

In August, the energy in European cities shifts. Walking down the streets in which locals usually walk or run, be it to work, to pick up children, to classes, the sensation is one of slowness, a lull, rush replaced by meandering. The idea of August as a month of rest is deeply embedded in the European conscience: it is a month to recharge, spend time with loved ones, travel. According to some statistics, more than half of Europeans will go on holiday this month. At the same time, for those in the tourism industry, the pace picks up, as European cities and shores are flooded with tourists that find this continent an attractive destination.

This approach to rest, travel, and relationships is - in my opinion - one of the beauties of life in this continent. But it is also a reminder of the disparities that come with being a European passport holder.