Beyond Binaries: lessons on authoritarian populism and democracy I'm taking into 2023
The end of the year and beginning of a new one is rife with writing on what’s passed and what’s to come. It’s a seemingly agreed upon time to pause and reflect. It’s a construct, but one I admit I value highly as it offers a moment, even if arbitrary, of introspection and intention-setting.
This time to pause and reflect is not unique to our personal lives. Thought leaders, journalists, academics also take to their respective outlets (or twitter) to consider whether, on balance, it has been a good or a bad year for society, and predict what’s to come. Was it a good or a bad year for democracy? And for the economy? Did the far right gain ground or lose it? Is there room for hope, or should we succumb to despair?
I, for one, wonder if this is an exercise that by its own nature is futile, presenting as a binary a reality that is extremely complex and rapidly evolving. Maybe it would be better to not think in binaries, in good or bad, hope or despair, but instead try to extract lessons and strategize based on those learnings.
When it comes to far right authoritarian populists, who are the focus of my own research, I would argue there are at least three things (although not the only ones) that the last few years have taught us about their workings:
The far right cross-pollinates across geographies and political systems, gets over disagreements quickly, and has become effective at seizing opportunities. Much like a fast-learning AI machine, authoritarian populists learn quickly and from each other and are adept at trying new formulas until one sticks;
The risk of political violence and hate crimes is on the rise in both Europe and North America and should be taken even more seriously;
The tide is turning in liberal democracies. Authoritarian populists operating within them have found ways to benefit from electoral processes to gain power, stay in power, and put democracy to their service and redefine it as illiberal.
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Mimicry, Cross-pollination, and Effective Opportunism
There are many ways in which different far right actors mimic and coordinate with each other strategically, be it at a discursive or policy level (more on this topic here, here, here, here, or here).
For example, authoritarian populists across the board claim to speak for “the people” and against the corrupt. Standing out against the powerful—even if they are powerful and corrupt themselves—gives them the legitimacy necessary to compete in an election. And they are finding success in this strategy.
And to be fair, this anti-institutional discourse works because there already exists a widespread lack of trust based on a reality of corruption and dissatisfaction with it. This mistrust they can exploit and cultivate, but did not create. The prevalence of corruption in many countries is a reality that can become an opportunity. If it works for one, others emulate it.
“Drain the swamp” may have been popularized by former US President Donald Trump, but it has become a slogan that crosses borders. Whether it’s the corruption scandal involving several Ministers of the European Parliament known as Qatargate or the vote to elect Rep Kevin McCarthy as speaker of the house in the US, it’s a sentence we’ve seen on the lips of extremists all around the world (the EU’s corruption scandal, as reported in Politico, involved “four individuals, including Greek MEP Eva Kailli and former MEP Antonio Panzeri, have been arrested as part of a probe by Belgian authorities stretching back to March 2021. The allegations—which include sensational details of cash found in suitcases and apartments, and multiple raids of homes and offices across Brussels— have rocked the EU.”)
Shortly after Qatargate became known, the authoritarian populist Hungarian Prime Minister Mr. Viktor Orban requested to “drain the swamp” and dissolve the European Parliament. In parallel, “never Kevin” Republican representatives were invoking the same “drain the swamp” rhetoric to vote against fellow party member McCarthy as speaker of the house. McCarthy was later elected after 15 (!) rounds of voting, but only after several concessions to the far-right contingent of his party.
Political Violence
Parallels and the exchange of strategies and ideas don’t stay at the narrative or policy level. Conspiracy theories also cross borders as do the mechanics that underpin political violence. As The Atlantic’s Anne Applebaum eloquently writes “Democratic revolutions have long been contagious. Now we know that antidemocratic revolutions can be too.”
According to this 2022 article, in the US, “since Trump took office, threats against members of Congress have increased 10-fold, with 9,625 incidents reported last year. The FBI has tripled its domestic terrorism budget, and the US Justice Department has created task forces to investigate the intimidation of public officials.” The January 6th attacks may have been the most visible and numerous, but by no means the only politically-motivated violent attack.
The parallelisms between political violence events across borders are further evident if we look at the recent events of January 8 in Brazil. Surely, there are differences: the January 6 protesters in Washington, DC were trying to prevent President Biden’s certification as head of state. In Brazil, meanwhile, incoming president Lula da Silva had already been inaugurated. Bolsonaro seemed to accept his defeat, while Trump never did. But in both cases, significant numbers of people stormed public buildings and were motivated by claims of a rigged election that resulted in the defeat of their preferred candidate (read this for more on who the protesters were).
Unfortunately, this kind of political violence, along with hate crimes, is not unique to democracies in the Americas. 2022 was also the year when German authorities arrested “25 suspected members of a far right group who they believe were preparing a violent coup to install a German aristocrat as national leader,” who posed a plausible threat, and were in possession of weapons.
How to play Democracy
‘Elections’ take place both in democracies and authoritarian regimes (e.g. China and Iran also celebrate elections). Yet what is perhaps more recent is that authoritarian-leaning populists in so far liberal democracies have been using democratic mechanisms to access power, stay in power, and if they lose an election, to try to seize power again. Electoral processes are the path towards forward in the attempts to redefine what until then was a liberal democracy (even if severely flawed) into one that aligns with their view of the world.
Once in power, they may attempt (overtly or more discreetly) to dismantle checks and balances and build a system that works in their favor. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban could claim to be the most inspiring of the pack, as he passed many reforms to his advantage while continuing to defend the procedural aspect of democracy (essentially, a minimalist approach to democracy that views it as a set of mechanisms concerned with processes that reflect the preferences of the majority.)
This minimalist conception of “democracy” is underpinned by a larger philosophical debate about what democracy actually is—can illiberal democracy still be a democracy? As historian Michael Ignatieff writes, “Democracy itself is not just an unruly contest for power, but also the site of an ongoing debate about what democracy is or should be. Illiberal, populist visions have long defined democracy as majority rule backing up a strong leader, while liberal definitions have long insisted that majority rule must be balanced by minority rights and countermajoritarian institutions.[...]”
He continues, “The illiberal authoritarians of our day, Viktor Orbán for example, are not the first autocrats to claim they are democrats, and they will not be the last. Authoritarian models of democracy have a long history and a likely future. It is fine to defend a substantively liberal conception of democracy provided you do not pretend that it is the only canonical possibility.”
There is much intellectual debate about whether such democracy can be really considered a democracy, but what is clear is that at least on the liberal front the tide is turning even beyond what we expected. This turn is aided by what Applebaum refers to as “Autocracy International,” a global cohort of antidemocratic influencers that “operate in different languages—French; Dutch; Spanish; Italian; English, obviously; German—and they borrow one another’s memes and rhetoric. But they have some in-person meetings hosted by different religious and far-right groups as well.”
We may not definitively get over the debates of what democracy really entails or whether an illiberal democracy can really be considered a democracy. But a turn to antidemocratic and illiberal practices will make progress towards social justice and belonging for all even harder. After all—even if flawed—liberal democracies are the best model we know so far that allows us to work on each of our issues, be it migration, racial justice, climate, and so forth. It’s the environment in which our work is located and, as if it were water, the dirtier it gets (and authoritarian populists are certainly polluting it), the harder it will be to swim in it towards progress. And a turn to an authoritarian regime or an illiberal democracy would deprive us all of water in the end.
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I hope 2023 will take us beyond simplistic binaries and towards a more holistic approach in our debates and strategies. One that does not get stuck on whether on balance things have been good or bad (or bad or not so bad), that has long-term vision and is both reactive and proactive, and looks at the constraints of the present as well as to the potentials of the future. In the quest to realize belonging for all, we will need a system that allows us to work collectively, experience joy, and let us dream of the unrealized potential that our communities hold.
In other news…
Each Year the Eurasia Group publishes “a forecast of the political risks that are most likely to play out over the course of the year.”
Four ways Netanyahu’s new government threatens democracy in Israel.
NATO - and America’s influence- is growing even stronger and larger.
Many are writing about the dangers of political violence, but on this issue I tend to rely on Rachel Kleinfeld’s work. On what to do about identity-based violence, Over Zero is a wonderful organization to follow and support (and Nichole Argo’s research is always excellent).
And for the soul…
Willow Defebaugh is a writer and climate activist, editor of the magazine Atmos. They were recently interviewed in the podcast series All the Small Things for an episode titled "transcending binary thinking" where they reflected on a holistic approach to activism and the need for joy in this space.
I picked up a copy of Patti Smith’s photography book “A Book of Days” and it has been a delight. I then learnt from my writer friend Kim that she also has a newsletter and shares short videos that are adorable.
Connecting the Dots: Musings on Bridging and Belonging is a monthly column by Míriam Juan-Torres. In it, Míriam reflects on current events, connecting the trends and considering the specificities across countries, applying a bridging and belonging lens and translating concepts from academia for a wider audience. In Connecting the Dots, Míriam carefully curates readings and resources to further expand our understanding and shed light on the complexities of our time. Join our mailing list to stay up to date on the latest of the Democracy & Belonging Forum's curated analysis from Miriam and more.
Editor's note: The ideas expressed in this blog are not necessarily those of the Othering & Belonging Institute or UC Berkeley, but belong to the authors.