The Multi-Headed Authoritarian Populist Coalition —and Its Fault Lines
Hercules Resting after Killing the Hydra by Giulio Romano (Giulio Pippi) (Italian, before 1499 - 1546)
As I try to make sense of European and American politics, the image that keeps coming to mind is that of a hydra. In Greek mythology, a hydra is a mythical serpent with multiple heads that grow back when cut off; persistent, multifaceted, and difficult to defeat. In the movie Captain America, hydra is a secretive authoritarian group with the motto: “Cut off one head, two more take its place.”
Authoritarian populist actors function like a multi-headed hydra in constant movement, and it is in part the internal diversity of the many “heads” that gives it its strength—but could also become its undoing. Despite somewhat different ideological goals, a broad coalition of interest groups (including white supremacists, Christian nationalists, tech oligarchs, anti-gender activists, ecofascists, and so on) has come together, both nationally and transnationally, realizing that their shared goals are more achievable if they join forces and change the political order together.
But not all heads of the hydra wield equal force. Tech oligarchs—especially Elon Musk—have acquired a distinct role, both in the US and globally, suggesting that their priorities may ultimately take predominance over those of their allies, which could eventually lead to conflict, fragmentation, and the breakdown of the authoritarian populist coalition. As tech billionaires take on a more central role, they may become a liability for authoritarian populist politicians. These leaders risk losing their credibility as champions of "the people" against the elites—even if that stance was always a pretense.
And these tensions may erupt not only between domestic allies but between international ones as well. Rising imperial ambitions in the U.S. and fractures among European far-right parties over foreign policy (for example, as it relates to Ukraine, defense spending, or NATO) suggest that competition within the movement globally may eventually intensify.
Yet while internal and international conflicts among the authoritarian populist coalition may well arise), they should not be assumed to be inevitable.
Before we dive deeper into understanding the authoritarian populist coalition, it’s crucial to distinguish between the “heads of the hydra,” the driving forces of authoritarian populism—politicians, tech oligarchs, and the movements that see them as useful conduits— and the voters who sustain them but may not fully support a regime of dominance and hierarchy. These highly active, well-resourced activist groups–the heads of the hydra–do not necessarily represent most voters (whether in the US or across Europe), but wield disproportionate political influence. (In this essay, “coalition” refers to these activists, not voters.)
Power in diversity: the benefits of the multi-headed hydra
Perhaps the greatest asset of coalitional diversity for authoritarian populists is in the journey to power, more so than in ruling itself. Indeed, coalitional diversity has allowed authoritarian populists to pose as if there is a little bit for everyone, with targeted messages disbursed to diverse audiences as relevant, whether one is attracted to anti-establishment or antipolitics, conservatism, religious fundamentalism, libertarianism, welfare benefits, small government, white supremacy, traditional family models, homonationalism, or a little bit of all of the above. United under the banner of being anti-establishment, the supplementary messages are framed to relevant groups as a defense of the family and traditional values, or of protection of women and the LGBTQ community from migrants and Islam, or a pursuit of innovation and efficiency, and so on.
While the narrative that “we need a change from the status quo” has become widely accepted across the political spectrum, authoritarian populists are persuading many that the answer lies in strongman rule and the rejection of universal values, human rights, and the rule of law—once upheld, however imperfectly (and sometimes willfully misused), as guiding principles, but now dismissed as identity-obsessed ideology rather than shared aspirations (I recommend this thread by Sanam Naraghi Anderlini).
And these targeted messages seem to be working. In the weeks prior to the 2025 German general election, for example, polls found that the extremist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was gathering supporters from across the board, be it workers, young men, or even amongst a plurality of gay men (although the latter’s data source is perhaps a bit more dubious). Predictions were confirmed as AfD came second in the elections, consolidating support across several East German regions, amongst the working class, and young people between the ages of 25 and 34 (as in other parts of the world, with a marked gender divide). Germany’s case is not isolated, as the diversity of voters in support of exclusionary agendas is replicated across countries.
The increasing success of authoritarian populists in appealing to diverse audiences is not a historical anomaly either, As historian Robert Paxton reminds us in his superb book the Anatomy of Fascism, fascist movements in the 20th Century brought together disparate coalitions of actors and mobilized diverse voters, drawing support across social classes, including workers, radical veterans, national syndicalists, futurist intellectuals, and conservatives. As today, “young people who had never voted before responded enthusiastically to fascism’s brand of antipolitical politics.” Paxton calls it a coalition of virtually all the discontented.
Back then, fascists and conservatives became united not in one cohesive ideology but in a front against socialism, joined by the idea “that imminent communist ‘terror’ justified the suspension of due process and the rule of law.” Today, the glue that holds the diverse authoritarian populist coalition together is a belief that certain hierarchies are natural and even desirable (often along racial or ethnic lines, but also through overlapping structures of power such as boss-ism, a concept rooted in the apartheid-era South African idea of baasskap) and a hatred directed at a vaguely defined enemy by the name of “woke/wokisme,” gender ideology, cultural Marxism, and other manufactured threats.
As traditional media collapses and mis/disinformation spreads, tech oligarchs have come to dominate the channels through which their messages and those of their allies (or at least those they choose to amplify) can be delivered. Notoriously, they have a much greater advantage reaching previously disengaged and disenchanted voters, who have become a key constituency for far-right actors across the world.
Tech oligarchs control the platforms that shape public opinion and political behavior by influencing people’s attention and, increasingly, people’s intentions (the intention economy refers to the commodification of previously unreachable levels of explicit and implicit data to “ultimately manipulate, modulate, and commodify human plans and purposes, both mundane (e.g., selecting a hotel) and profound (e.g., selecting a political candidate).” The Magnificent Seven companies (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Tesla) are already entrenched quasi-monopolies organizing the information ecosystem. As economist Paul Krugman remarks, unlike past technological revolutions that disrupted market hierarchies, this one is reinforcing them (see this visual).
But could the diversity of the authoritarian populist coalition backfire?
While having a diverse coalition disburse targeted messages to distinct audiences can be powerful when vying for popular support, the diversity of interests represented in this coalition may present difficulties when actually governing.
Drawing from historical precedent, Paxton notes that fascist rule was ultimately deeply chaotic, with former allies often turning into rivals if the leader veered from what each interest group deemed most important. Betrayals were met with either domination, repression, or accommodation.
We can expect similar power struggles to emerge today. But these struggles, unlike in the past, will likely extend beyond political leaders merely managing allies. Tech oligarchs like Musk are historically unique in that they don’t just support authoritarian leaders with enormous wealth—they compete with them for prominence, having moved from playing supportive characters to leading roles, have much greater sway than other coalition partners (and likely influence over their fates), and are far less constrained by others’ beloved (literal) borders. (Musk is particularly unique in that he isn’t just the face of his companies; he has become a brand unto himself that seems “too big to fail.” In the past few months alone Musk “added more than 20 countries to its customer base for Starlink, meaning it now provides services in more than 100 countries and territories.”)
Tech oligarchs’ push for an illiberal or authoritarian system isn’t just ideological (although there is strong reason to believe that at least some of them fully buy into the supremacist worldview); it serves their interests by removing barriers to unchecked expansion, and allows them to use nationally rooted supremacist politicians to empower and expand outwardly their internationalist interests. Yet this pursuit may create tensions within the broader authoritarian populist coalition, as their global business ambitions clash with the nativist agendas of political allies.
If history is any guide, maintaining unity may once again require coercion, division, and calculated concessions, which I doubt will be met with a smile. Tech oligarchs’ dominance over the informational infrastructure gives them immense discretionary power to influence the reach of their allies, making the potential for abuse and retaliation a greater possibility.
The riff-raff in the US earlier this year over H1B visas between those primarily concerned with closing borders and defending white nationalism and the tech oligarchs who want the freedom to hire (particularly low-wage workers) from anywhere is a prime example of emerging cleavages.
We can also imagine these conflicts playing out at the international level. While most tech oligarchs are based in the US, their tendrils reach overseas to find the most appropriate allies (and sometimes to bully them). Ahead of the US 2024 general election, Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg reflected on his hope that Trump would meddle with EU tech regulations, a message that US vice-president JD Vance has been quick to deliver. All along, Musk has been shopping for the best politicians/allies to serve his interests, found in Reform in the UK and AfD in Germany.
The tech oligarchs’ top-down approach with these actors, however, could trigger resentment both from far-right European politicians, who in any case do not have a united front themselves, as well as with more mainstream European leaders, who may still be trying to find their footing in how to interact with the Trump administration and tech oligarchs but, as of yet, are unwilling to fold (at least fully).
Tech oligarchs will ultimately put their own interests over national ones, which is at odds with authoritarian populist politicians’ “nation-first” rhetoric. Since Trump’s election, European far-right politicians have engaged in even greater public idolatry, but Trump’s tariff threats—which would likely raise consumer prices in the very communities they court—could spark conflict if they come to fruition. European voters may blame America for their woes, reviving long-standing anti-American sentiment, which recent studies show is already on the rise in Europe.
On the voter side, the tech oligarchs’ prominence could present difficulties for politicians who are strongly reliant on anti-establishment support to get to power. Authoritarian populist politicians drive much of their electoral strength by pulling from the populist playbook. Many voters are drawn to them for their “for the people” rhetoric—critiquing elites for a system that genuinely fails millions worldwide. Tech oligarchs such as Peter Thiel and Musk openly embrace authoritarian and supremacist rule, but they are decisively not populists either in substance or style. If the dominant head of the authoritarian populist hydra removes populism from the equation, could it be that the monster loses a big source of its strength amongst the public?
Recent backlash to Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s attempt to negotiate a deal with Musk may be an indication that authoritarian populists will experience challenges in navigating the fine line between cajoling tech oligarchs that boost them and being perceived as selling out their country to them.
In addition, if the Musk and the Muskenjugend takeover of the US government is showing us anything it is that the impact of their actions is far, wide, and sloppy. As their decisions affect people who had given authoritarian populists their vote (directly or their family and friends), MAGA may begin to lose favor. As writer Hamilton Nolan reminds us, “Of the portion of Trump’s base that are MAGA faithful—the red hat variety of Republicans—a majority or close to a majority are going to bear significant negative material impacts from the actions that Trump is allowing Elon Musk to take.”
Moving Forward
Despite chaos, authoritarian regimes can endure for extended periods, and much is still unknown. Thus, we shouldn’t derive comfort from the possibility of internal conflict and become passive while we expect the movement to implode.
As the story goes, the hydra was eventually defeated by Hercules. It was not an easy feat. It required strategy and teamwork. Hercules cut each of the hydra’s heads, immediately cauterizing each neck with the help of his nephew. He finally dealt with the immortal head and then dipped his arrows in the hydra’s blood to make his weapons more powerful.
The actors involved in authoritarian populist politics across the globe seem to keep growing, the tools and powers available to them as well. But unlike in the clean and easy narrative of a superhero movie, this hydra is not a cohesive movement with a structured ideology moving in unison, which can be defeated by one heroic actor (and it is definitely not secretive).
The current moment demands that we work alongside uncomfortable allies and confront the complexity and magnitude of the dilemmas ahead with openness rather than absolute certainty (for example, Romania’s annulled election highlights the complex moral dilemmas of defending democracy amid tech dominance and geopolitical interference.) We will face profound democratic challenges, requiring us to navigate tensions between peace and justice, reclaim ideals that have long fallen short and hold ourselves and others accountable to realize them, and offer meaningful alternatives to those who initially supported authoritarian populism out of disillusionment with a broken status quo.
The overwhelming power of tech giants like the "Magnificent Seven" highlights the need for local, in-person organizing that bypasses digital platforms and strengthens real-world connections.
To counter authoritarian populism, we must develop a vision of change that does not merely defend the status quo or replicate zero-sum, hierarchical thinking, and work to serve the real material needs of people across populations (this is a great resource on practical policies for change, targeted universalism may also be a way forward). Just as the diversity of the authoritarian populist coalition helped bring it to power, we, too, must invest in broad-based coalition-building and an array of tactics—organized noncooperation, symbolic defiance, boycotts, protests, and local bridging efforts—to mount an effective response.
If the seismic shifts we are seeing teach us anything is that we can dream of what previously seemed impossible.
In other news…
At the Forum, we are trying to create a space to learn from each other across sectors and contexts. We’ve just released a call for case studies that showcase bridging and belonging approaches to countering authoritarian populism in Europe and North America.
Unfortunately, the EU Commission is poised to propose migrant 'return hubs' in legislation. But at least so far it seems European Courts are upholding human rights and EU agencies and countries accountable. In a February ruling, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Greece had illegally deported a Turkish woman to Turkey, stating that there are "strong indications" that the Greek authorities used "a systematic practice of 'pushbacks'."
The next technological frontier is even scarier. By studying a mouse’s visual cortex, scientists have been able to decipher what a mouse was seeing and manipulate its brain activity. As one of the researchers stated, “What we can do today in a mouse could be done tomorrow in a human”, making neuro-rights even more important.
Beyond Molotovs – A Visual Handbook of Anti-Authoritarian Strategies is a publication that brings together over 50 first-hand accounts from anti-authoritarian movements, activists, and artists, focusing on the sensuous and emotive dimension of their strategies.
And for the soul…
A couple of months ago I discovered the work of Jillian Hess, who writes a newsletter focused on “note-takers” with an overview of their note-taking life, inspiring quotes, archival photos, and meditations on what she has learned from their notes. I loved learning about how the artist Hilma af Klint used notes from the spirit world to create her art, how MLK Jr. organized his notes for speeches, or how Sylvia Plath used visual notes. I believe I can share monthly free subscriptions, message me if you’d like one!
Connecting the Dots: Musings on Bridging and Belonging is a monthly column by Míriam Juan-Torres. In it, Míriam reflects on current events, connecting the trends and considering the specificities across countries, applying a bridging and belonging lens and translating concepts from academia for a wider audience. Join our mailing list to stay up to date on the latest of the Democracy & Belonging Forum's curated analysis from Miriam and more.
Editor's note: The ideas expressed in this blog are not necessarily those of the Othering & Belonging Institute or UC Berkeley, but belong to the authors.