Win Some, Lose Some: Making Sense of Authoritarian Populists’ Wins, Losses, and Shifting Relationships in 2024's Summer of Chaos
Original illustration by Dorottya Kranicz for Fine Acts x OBI
There is not love of life without despair about life.― Albert Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays
I would like to believe that having two grandmothers who have experienced a short-lived republic, a civil war, dictatorship, World War II, a democratic transition, and liberal democracy within a parliamentary monarchy gives me, when needed, a sense of historical perspective. When I feel the nausea of political events unfolding at a vertiginous pace, I think of their lives and—unfortunately for my grandmothers—often subject them to interrogation. Are our times worse? Better? Do they feel different? What is clouding my perception?
The last few weeks have felt particularly disconcerting, as unprecedented political events played out across Europe and North America, developing at such a fast pace that there was little time to fully comprehend their impact or make sense of their implications. In the US, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on former president Donald Trump demonstrated that the threat of political violence continues to rise (an attempt which followed attacks on the Slovakian and Danish prime ministers and other European campaigners just a few weeks earlier), while President Biden's unprecedented decision to not run for re-election changed the US political landscape in mere minutes. Just a few days before Biden announced he won’t stand for office, Trump chose extremist Ohio Senator JD Vance as his running mate. This choice is perhaps an omen of what’s to come if Trump is to win the election, as Vance embodies a rupture with previous Republican dogma and the consummation of the GOP Trump takeover.
In Europe, meanwhile, the far right made significant gains in the June European Union Parliament elections, while France's Left landed a surprising victory in snap elections just days later, although the authoritarian populist party National Rally (RN) now has more seats in the French National Assembly than any other single party (this article unpacks how RN applied old school local politics to build a national movement). In the UK, the left-learning Labour Party won in national elections, although a closer look at these results shows that participation was low and that Labour actually obtained more votes in 2019 than in 2024. Labour’s resounding seat majority in Parliament is partially the result of the peculiar British first-past-the-post electoral system, as well as strategic campaigning and tactical voting that focused on key constituencies.
Overall, the rapid pace of political developments and changing expectations has made it difficult to fully comprehend this moment in the course of a larger history and what it means for the global authoritarian populist project. Indeed, even my grandmas suggest that this time feels particularly stressful and confusing.
So how can we attempt to make sense of this moment? Analysis abounds. Given that far-right landslides were expected, some interpret the results of the French and EU Parliament elections with relief, viewing them as proof that the narrative that populism is rising is not accurate, that maybe there is a glass ceiling that Europe’s authoritarian populists have hit and will not break (authoritarian populist parties juxtapose elites vs the people and us-vs-them discourse targeting minorities, while they promote a nativist project and seek to achieve power through electoral procedures).
Indeed, it is undeniably good news that the French far-right party does not have the power to choose a Prime Minister. It is also encouraging to see that even last-minute coalitions of actors with significant differences can prevent authoritarian populists from reaching power, and that extremists do not have a majority at the EU parliament. At the same time, we would be remiss if we interpreted this as peak authoritarian populism. Even their “losses” so far show progression, and the big takeaways from EU, UK, and French elections prove that far-right containment is a mirror to a more complex reality, not the defeat of the nativist project.
Recent electoral results, the formation of new far-right alliances, and dramatic campaign announcements reveal that, on the authoritarian populist side, there is a lot of possibility for a multipronged strategy—whether conscious or accidental—that can help far-right actors exert complementary roles and align with different audiences (they also suggest—fortunately—that this is also possible on the pro-democracy and pro-justice side).
The Trump and Vance ticket is a combination that allows this candidacy to appeal to a range of constituencies, both at home and abroad. Vance himself, in his acceptance speech, spoke of a big tent. The realignment of the EU’s far-right parties into three groups at the EU parliament allows for differentiated roles: Meloni’s group can play tough within acceptability politics, while Orbán’s and the group of Alternative für Deutschland can play tough guy.
Fractured or Complementary?
From Half a year of European Elections
Despite their gains, authoritarian populist parties were expected to do better in the EU Parliament elections than they did, with some analysts claiming that the center ultimately held. It is true that the center-right and center-left groupings are first and second in total seat numbers at the EU parliament, but far-right groups have decisively shifted the center of gravity at the European Union Parliament, as they now enjoy greater levels of representation and influence on decision-making (at the EU Parliament, national parties come together under joint groups).
Since the elections, far-right parties’ have been moving to arrange themselves into different coalitions. While at first there were talks of a pan-European mega-coalition, that has not come to fruition and three far-right groups now coexist. They all share a strong anti-immigration stance and proximity to the US MAGA movement but diverge in foreign policy and the strength of their appeals to white supremacy.
The oldest far-right group is the European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), of which Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is the most prominent figure. This group is somewhat different from the others in that it supports Ukraine, does not hold close ties to Putin, and is not as challenging to EU economic orthodoxy as other far-right groups.
In mid-July, Hungarian far-right leader Viktor Orbán announced the creation of a new group, Patriots of Europe, which France’s RN, Italy’s Lega, Spain’s Vox, and others have joined (earlier this month begun Hungary’s turn to hold the presidency of the Council of the European Union and Orbán quickly revealed that their slogan for their term is “Make Europe Great Again”–what sounds best, MEGA or MAGA?)
Just two days later, it was announced that an even more extremist group was formed under the name of the Europe of Sovereign Nations, which includes the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Poland’s Confederation, as well as other small parties that have been closely aligned with overtly supremacist discourse and oppose the Green Deal and European integration (AfD leaders have been involved in a plethora of scandals involving Nazi remarks).
One reading from this three-way split is that the far-right is fractured, and thus their power will be limited. This may indeed be true. At the same time, while there are reports of Meloni’s rage at the Patriots formation (they have replaced her group as the third force at the EU Parliament), having two even more extreme groups means that the centrists could justify working with her and ECR on account of them being more “moderate.” Granted, she’s still adamantly far-right, heir of a fascist party, anti-migrant, anti-LGBT, and so on, but she represents the palatable far-right and so the cordon sanitaire may no longer apply to her, the red line drawn for those who come after. As long as she falls in line on foreign policy and economics, it is possible to turn a blind eye to her scapegoating of those with less structural power and her internal politics, which include persecution of press critical with her government or a crackdown on civil society and LGBT rights.
While the Greens and Socialists still refuse to deal with the three far-right groups, the Conservatives are working with the ECR (not with ESN or the Patriots), two EU Parliamentarians from the ECR have been elected as vice-presidents of the EU Parliament. Yet it must also be acknowledged that given how many citizens support politicians from the ECR (and the Patriots), it is hard to justify fully excluding them from democratic institutions (and given the need for consensus voting, perhaps mathematically impossible).
To the US Election in November
Across the pond, Trump and Vance can perform different roles in a similar movie: who plays somewhat palatable versus who acts extreme (which may at times shift), who embodies emotion and who develops the intellectual thought of the MAGA movement, who appeals to business and who speaks to the working class, all while maintaining the same extreme policy proposals.
After the assassination attempt, President Trump and his team—always within the range of Trump’s bombastic style—are promoting a softer image and on the surface calling for de-escalation. In Trump’s acceptance speech, he claimed “the discord and division in our society must be healed.” Vance has made no secret of his admiration for extreme conspiracist Alex Jones, the ideas of Curtis Yarvin (who says American democracy should be toppled), or his friendship with Peter Thiel.
Vance claims to be a beacon for economic populism, while Trump has continued to show his penchant for business-friendly policies.
Given what we’ve grown accustomed to in the past few years, Vance’s acceptance speech does not stand out that much. But a close read of Vance’s speech gives us glimpses into his ideology. Vance, after all, is a man of ideas in the same way that Trump is a man of instinct and performance.
In his speech, Vance spoke of homeland, of generations born and dead in the USA that know in their bones that it is their home, and yes, to some immigrants, like his wife’s family, that have also contributed to America, but in the terms of–it is implied– true Americans (one does not need to try too hard to imagine who the true Americans are).
This is strongly reminiscent of the mainstay belief in “blood and soil” that has permeated European far-right intellectual and social movements for decades, but also more common understandings of the nation in Europe (it has of course had a strong footing amongst white supremacists in the US, but there was a different narrative of the US as a land of immigrants and rooted in constitutional ideas that stood in contrast to “old continent” lore).
Scholar Cynthia Miller-Idriss, in her book Hate in the Homeland, unpacks the importance of spaces and geographies for the far-right. As she says, “issues of territory, belonging, exclusion, race, and national geographies are foundational for imagining collective pasts as well as anticipated futures.” National myths, “mediate not only the imagined past but also white fears and hopes about uncertain futures whose end results are either apocalyptic demise or aspirational future glory.”
As Miller-Idriss says, homelands are biological and ecological concepts, linking a sense of belonging to the body and the home. Homelands are linked to rootedness and belonging to local regions, but are also clearly racialized (incidentally, European white supremacists are rhetorically using North American indigenous experiences to create a cautionary tale of what—they say—will happen to white Europeans if migrants are allowed to take over).
When it comes to foreign policy, Vance has expressed antagonism to supporting Ukraine, and in this he will find allies in the European parties that conform to the Patriots and the Europe of Sovereign Nations. Over the past month, Orbán has already set the expectations if Trump wins. After trips to China and Russia that have set alarm bells ringing in Brussels, the Hungarian PM has said that the “likely outcome” of a Trump victory meant that the EU should reopen “direct lines of diplomatic communication” with Russia and “high-level political talks” with China.
A Cautionary Note: Thinking and Acting Beyond Elections
We have passed the halfway point of what’s been dubbed the “year of elections.” I would say that so far, authoritarian populists are doing pretty well, even if it was expected that they would do better and have been somewhat contained. On the bright side, across the globe, several elections, from India to the EU, show us that coalitions and bridging can be useful to contain or maim the power of extremists, even if containment is only effective in the short term.
Elections raise the temperature and deepen polarization. Even if polarization already exists, electoral campaigns are platforms for discourse that filters everything through us-vs-them dynamics and can contribute to political violence. Elections also allow authoritarian populists to entrench their populist framing of elites vs the people, and demonize those who don’t share their views as the enemy of the people.
Elections are indeed important, a key tool to access power. But lest we forget, recent elections ought to remind us that they are one amongst many tools for social change. This piece by journalist Hamilton Nolan made me reflect (which is not the same to say that I agree with all of the analysis):
Movements exist before and after and beyond elections. […] In the case of almost every familiar movement— civil rights, labor rights, gender equality, gay rights, anti-war movements, and on and on—the left was on the morally correct but politically unpopular side. How did they win anything, then? By forming national and international social and political movements made up of thousands and millions of people engaged in protest and direct action and education and community building and labor organizing and other actions outside of electoral politics that, over time, change society of itself and thereby cause politicians to follow that change. To focus only on the politicians and the elections is to miss the underlying fact that those officials ultimately do not cause change themselves—they are the end products of change. If you are interested in true insight into change, it is much more instructive to think about electoral politics in terms of its place in broader movements, rather than vice versa.
As Building Belonging’s Brian Stout has also said, “we must have a broad movement for transformation—bigger than and distinct from the campaign itself—that correctly understands the election as only one (and not even the most important) of many strategies for transforming society.”
Given our current landscape, it would be easy to despair. Instead, maybe we can do as the Mediators Foundation suggests and retire optimism and pessimism and instead focus on possibility (thanks Julia Roig for sharing, her Linkedin is gold).
As I started this essay with a beautiful quote from Albert Camus, I end it reflecting on the legacy of another Albert, my uncle who just passed away. Faced with health adversity all his life, he never entertained defeat or pessimism, not even in his last days. He always confronted challenges with fortitude, always focused on the possibility of a fruitful life and a devotion to joy, humor, and his loved ones. An energy that, as suggested, maybe we can bring to our work and movements as we grapple with the trials and tribulations of our era.
In Other News…
The far-right Patriots want to lead the culture committee…
Is Meloni’s mask starting to slip?
Israeli violence against Palestinians in Gaza continues, including in areas that had been designated as humanitarian zones.
Podcast on political violence.
Food for thought: “The characterisation as far or hard right is easy, but lazy. Left-right conflates so many different dimensions into one that the use of left-right is at best meaningless, but often misinformative.”
And for the Soul…
If you are lucky, summer can be a time to rest a bit, go on holidays, and move at a slower pace. Books can be good companions, a balm for the soul. Over the past few years, I have found the following to be heartwarming or they have allowed me to escape to other realms:
The Signature of All ThingsBanyan Moon
M Train
The Stationery Shop of Tehran
The Island of Missing Trees
Small Pleasures
Ariadne
Lillian Boxfish Takes a Walk
El Amante Japonés
Conversaciones en la Catedral
Looking for Eliza
Ghana Must Go
and if you want some non-fiction, I’d recommend:
Devotions: The Selected Poems of Mary Oliver
Stolen Focus
No Meat Required
Love That Journey for Me: The Queer Revolution of Schitt's Creek
A Short History of Queer Women
Save Me the Plums: My Gourmet Memoir (or all of Ruth Reichl’s memoirs)
The Art of Living
The Odd Woman and the City
Blood, Bones, and Butter: The Inadvertent Education of a Reluctant Chef
Do No Harm: Stories of Life, Death, and Brain Surgery
Happy August!
PS: I tried to narrow it down, I may have revealed a bit much about myself with this book list…
Connecting the Dots: Musings on Bridging and Belonging is a monthly column by Míriam Juan-Torres. In it, Míriam reflects on current events, connecting the trends and considering the specificities across countries, applying a bridging and belonging lens and translating concepts from academia for a wider audience. Join our mailing list to stay up to date on the latest of the Democracy & Belonging Forum's curated analysis from Miriam and more.
Editor's note: The ideas expressed in this blog are not necessarily those of the Othering & Belonging Institute or UC Berkeley, but belong to the authors.